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theory of "Chapter Six-and-a-Half" operations, that is, actions that go beyond purely
diplomatic measures, but stop short of enforcement by military means. By analogy, the
same theory applies to regional arrangements under the UN Charter, where it takes the
form of "Article Fifty-Two-and-a-Half" actions.
As for peace-enforcement measures, the Law is somewhat ambiguous. It speaks about
"international enforcement measures involving the application of armed force, undertaken
under the decision of the UN Security Council," but it remains unclear whether that
provision applies to regional arrangements as well. That ambiguity could be clarified by
subsequent practice of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which has a body of
treaties on regional peace operations, including enforcement measures. However, that very
scenario scares some partners of Russia in that post-Soviet arrangement.
The Law and the practice of its application, though limited, provide a partial answer
to the question raised by the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament in its petition to
the Constitutional Court, which I briefly discussed above. Under the Law, the President
files a proposal for a dispatch of troops with the upper chamber. The proposal provides
details of the area of operations, mission, numerical strength, composition of a contingent,
subordination, duration of deployment, procedures for rotation and withdrawal, as well
as of salaries, allowances, benefits and compensation for servicemen and their families.
The proposal is then voted upon by the Council of Federation, and subsequently the
President issues a decree ordering troops into action. Recently the procedure proved to
be workable when a decision was taken to send a Russian airborne brigade to join the
NATO contingent in Bosnia. It remains to be seen what would happen, however, should
the Council of Federation reject the President's proposal.
However, the Law on the Provision of Personnel avoids instances to which the "Uniting
for Peace" Resolution of the UN General Assembly could be applied. It is unclear whether
drafters of the Law were influenced by traditionally negative Soviet attitude toward that
Resolution, or were simply unaware of its existence.
Finally, in my opinion, the Russian Law on the Provision of Personnel contains language
that may come into conflict with certain important stipulations of the UN Charter, although
these Charter provisions are dormant at this moment. Should provisions of the Charter's
Article 43 be activated, and agreements between the Security Council and member states
be concluded contributing contingents to a UN force, those contingents should then be
readily available to the Security Council on short notice. Those requirements notwithstand-
ing, however, the Law on the Provision of Personnel sets the general rule that the Russian
Federation shall decide whether to take part in a peace operation on a case-by-case basis.
Despite a reference in the law to obligations under the UN Charter and other international
treaties, these obligations are only to be "taken into consideration," while the final decision
is being worked out.
This, then, has been a brief overview of the evolving Russian experience with regard
to the dispatch of troops to peace operations.
THE WAR PowERs IN FRENCH CONsTITrUoNAL LAW
By Elisabeth Zoller*
In France, the war powers are addressed by constitutional provisions very similar to
those found in the Constitution of the United States. Like the President of the United
States, the President of the French Republic is Commander in Chief. Article 15 of the
* University of Paris II.
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Constitution of 1958 provides: "The President of the Republic shall be Commander of
the Armed Forces." Like Congress, the French Parliament has the power to declare war.
Article 35 reads as follows: "Parliament shall authorize the declaration of war."
The distribution of war powers between the Executive branch and the legislative branch
was adopted well before the Constitution of 1958. It was hammered out in 1790 during
the course of the parliamentary debate that followed the so-called Nootka Sound attack.'
In the Nootka Sound bay, off the coast of what is now British Columbia, British boats
had been captured by Spanish warships and London was seeking redress from Madrid,
which in turn refused it. Seeking support from the so-called "Family Compact" (Pacte
defamille) entered into by the Bourbons of France, Spain, the two Sicilys and Parma in
1761, Spain requested French assistance against Great Britain. On May 14, 1790, Louis
XVI-at that time still King of France-proposed an appropriation bill to the National
Assembly in order to fit out fourteen French warships in the case of a conflict with Great
Britain. The National Assembly passed the bill, but took advantage of the case to raise
the constitutional issue of the right to wage war. To whom did that right belong: to the
King or to the National Assembly? The decree adopted by the National Assembly on May
22, 1790 gave a balanced answer to the question. It decided that the right to declare war
belonged to the National Assembly, whereas the right to conduct the hostilities-namely,
the power to command the armed forces-fell within the power of the Executive. Thus,
in France as in the United States, war powers are not centralized in one hand, but shared
between the legislative branch and the Executive branch. Such a distribution of powers
may be considered as a genuine implementation of the republican form of government,
which requires policy judgements to be made by several persons, not just one.
The republican distribution of war powers between the Executive branch and the legisla-
tive branch has been enshrined in all democratic French constitutions. Leaving aside the
Vichy regime, it has not left French constitutional law since 1875, when the Third Republic
came into being. But its practical implementation has never worked very smoothly. This
was true before the Constitution of 1958; it is even more true after it.
The War Powers Before the Constitution of 1958
In theory, practical implementation of the republican distribution of war powers between
the Executive branch and the legislative branch is supposed to unfold in a three-step
procedure: the Executive requests Parliament to authorize armed operations; Parliament
gives its authorization to the Executive; and the Executive launches the armed operation.
In French constitutional practice, things never worked this way.
Regarding the constitutional practice of the Third Republic (1875-1940), the first wars
to be addressed were the various colonial wars fought by France in North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa and in Southeast Asia. In respect of all these wars, the Executive never
sought declarations of war from Parliament because it was commonly accepted that wars
were waged against states, not against peoples. Under international law in force at that
time, statehood was denied to peoples subject to colonial conquest. Parliamentary consent
was however obtained through the usual mechanisms of the parliamentary regime, namely
the political accountability of the Executive before Parliament. This form of parliamentary
consent worked at least once in connection with a colonial war. On March 30, 1885, the
Jules Ferry cabinet was overthrown by the National Assembly in response to the military
disaster encountered by the French forces in the Gulf of Tonkin. The constitutional practice
ran very differently following the outburst of the two World Wars in 1914 and 1939. In
1914, the question of parliamentary authorization did not arise inasmuch as France, being
'The parliamentary debate is reproduced in ORATmURS DE LA RgVOL.TION FRAN4AISE, T.I: Las CONSTmANTS
(1989).
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attacked-Germany declared war on France on August 3 and Parliament convened on
August 4-had no need to formally declare war on Germany. 2 The President of the Repub-
lic sent a message to Parliament, which approved it by casting a vote of confidence in
favor of the government. In 1939, the situation was the opposite in that France had to
declare war on Germany in order to meet her treaty obligations toward Poland. Nonetheless
Parliament did not formally authorize the government to declare war on Germany. As it
was abundantly clear that the chambers did not have the political will to declare war, the
government-in order to comply with the constitutional requirements requesting parlia-
mentary consent to war-had to circumvent the issue of a formal authorization to declare
war. Instead, it proposed an appropriation bill requesting special funds in order "to meet the
needs of the international situation." After tumultuous debates, the bill was unanimously
adopted. This vote was interpreted by the government as implicitly authorizing it to declare
war on Germany.
During the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), France undertook several armed interventions
abroad, particularly in its colonial empire. These interventions were never subject to "dec-
larations of war" in the formal sense of the term, nor were they formally authorized before
being undertaken. During the Suez crisis (1956), for example, the National Assembly
merely approved the government's policy by a vote of confidence that was taken on the
very same day the ultimatum addressed to Egypt expired.
If any lesson can be learned from this experience, it is that the law in the Constitution
is one thing, and the law in action another. However, in terms of constitutional lawfulness,
the situation is perhaps less serious than it looks at first glance because the Third and the
Fourth Republics were parliamentary regimes. In a parliamentary regime, the Premier and
the ministers are answerable to Parliament for the Cabinet's policy. From this basic tenet,
two consequences follow. On the one hand, Parliament can always force the government
to resign by adopting a vote of defiance. As long as Parliament does not act, silence means
consent. On the other hand and by implication, the government is always supposed to
conduct policy with the support of a parliamentary majority. If, however, a loss of confi-
dence among parliamentarians occurs, the Cabinet or, depending on the circumstances, the
Minister who is responsible for the policy under attack, is expected to resign.3 Therefore, in
respect of the constitutional practice followed under the Third and the Fourth Republics,
it could be said that, as long as the government remained in power (that is, it was not
overthrown by a vote of defiance), armed operations that were not previously authorized
by Parliament were in fact necessarily approved by implication. This constitutional analysis
should however be mitigated by the political realities, in particular by the fact that parlia-
ments in most parliamentary regimes have been progressively infiltrated by disciplined
parties that distort traditional parliamentary techniques of control and accountability.
War Powers After the Constitution of 1958
Under the Fifth Republic, the war powers were not a constitutional issue until the late
1970s. Neither President De Gaulle nor Pompidou sent French troops abroad in armed
intervention. It was President Giscard d'Estaing who launched the first peace operation
in 1978 when he ordered the Legion to quell the rebellion in Kolwezi, Zaire. No preliminary
authorization was sought from Parliament, which discussed the matter three weeks after
the mission. A similar pattern was followed in the case of the French intervention in Chad
in 1983-but the parliamentary debate took place even later: nine weeks after the mission.
Regarding the peace operations undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations,
2 The point is made by M. HAuRiou, PRMcis DE DRorr CONsTmrnorNmN. 422 n.45 (1962).
3 For an account of the resignation of Lord Carrington in 1982 after the unexpected Argentine invasion of
the Falkland Islands, see C. TuRPiN, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSMrION 432-33 (2d ed. 1990).
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they are always decided-and can only be decided-by the President of the Republic in
his capacity as Commander of the armed forces (Article 15 of the Constitution). However,
neither in the case of Lebanon (1978) or Cambodia (1991), nor in the case of the territory
of Yugoslavia (1992), has preliminary parliamentary authorization ever been sought from
Parliament. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UN peace operations must be
considered as undertaken in the pursuance of the UN Charter. For all practical purposes,
this means that parliamentary authorization must be considered as having been given by
anticipation when Parliament approved the ratification of the UN Charter. This reasoning
enables the government to claim that the agreements that place French forces under UN
command do not come within the categories of treaties that must be approved by Parliament
and, in a more general manner, that "French participation in UN peace keeping missions
finds its justification in the Charter itself."4
With the exception of Article 16 on emergency powers (which is irrelevant in the case
of peace operations and thus beyond the scope of this study,)' the Constitution of October
4, 1958 did not change the republican distribution of war powers between the Executive
branch and the legislative branch. 6 The President of the Republic is the commander in
chief (Article 15) and Parliament must authorize the declaration of war (Article 35). How-
ever, the manner in which Article 35 is today commonly construed by French legal scholars
and policy makers has greatly impoverished the republican principle of shared responsibili-
ties in respect of peace operations.
The starting point of the legal analysis is the interpretation given to Article 35. It is
widely held that Article 35 has become inapplicable because today states no longer may
declare war. French scholars contend that today a declaration of war is an unlawful act
under international law. These scholars believe that the only lawful war under contempo-
rary international law is a war of self-defense, which in their view does not require declara-
tion. Whatever the merits of the argument, which need not at this point be discussed from
an international legal standpoint, there is no doubt that the alleged impermissibility of a
declaration of war explains the statement made by President Mitterrand during the Gulf
War when he said that France was declaring war on no one, but was acting within the
legal framework of the United Nations. However he also said that Parliament would be
referred to in due course.7 Indeed, on convocation by Decree of the President of the
Republic, Parliament convened for a special session on January 16, 1991, the day after
the ultimatum to Iraq had expired. The parliamentary session did not last more than an
afternoon. It was officially closed on January 17, 1991 by a Decree of the President of
the Republic.
Once it had decided that Article 35 was to be held inapplicable in the case of the Gulf
War, the government had no other option than to find a substitute in the traditional tech-
niques of the parliamentary regime if it wanted-as it claimed it did-Parliament to be
in a position "to exercise its power in its entirety." 8 Thus, it put into question its political
responsibility before the National Assembly by calling a vote of confidence on its policy
4 See the survey of French practice of international law by Charpentier in 24 AFDI 1133-36 (1978) and 28
AFDI 1065 (1982).
5Article 16 provides in part that "when the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation,
the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are threatened in a grave and
immediate manner," the President of the Republic-subject to certain procedural conditions-shall take the
measures commanded by the circumstances. Fr. Const., Art.16.
6 See, EusABmmr ZoTLTiR, DRorr DEs RELATIONS ExTrbmus 85 (1992).
7 D. Maus, Lapratique institutionnellefrangaise: ler Octobre 1990-31 Dicembre 1990,5 REvuE FAIMsE
DE DRorr CoNs'rrrtiorNL 91 (1991).
$See, JouRNL OmnciEL DfBATS, ASSEMBLtu NA-IONALE, Dec. 12, 1990, at 6748.
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in the Gulf War. In the National Assembly as well as in the Senate, the government won
overwhelming majorities. The problem is that these votes did not have the slightest effect
on the decision to order French forces to participate in the "Desert Storm" operation
against Iraq, since that decision was not within the power of the government but within
the power of the President. Moreover, even before the votes were taken in Parliament,
the presidential spokesman declared that the votes would not affect the presidential deci-
sion. From a constitutional standpoint, that statement was perfectly correct since the French
President is not politically responsible before the National Assembly. Had the votes how-
ever been negative, the government would have had to resign. Had those events occurred,
the constitutional and political situation would have been quite surrealistic, with a President
without a government having to enforce his decisions.
The French constitutional practice followed during the Gulf War is a very instructive
experience. The most important practical result is that the French President has discretion-
ary power to decide peace operations involving armed forces-operations that are tanta-
mount to what in the United States would be considered "war." It should be noted that
there has been hardly any objection against such a generous interpretation of presidential
war powers. Some commentators went so far as to say that there was no need for Parliament
to cast a vote on the issue because Article 15, which makes the President Commander in
Chief, was itself a sufficient legal basis for the President to order French troops to join
the American-led coalition. Secondly, it is now clear that Article 35 of the Constitution
is widely considered to be obsolete.9 This is the crux of the matter because Article 35 is
indeed the only constitutional check against the Commander in Chief. Mutatis mutandis,
the situation is as serious as it would be in this country if presidential war powers were
to be exercised free of the limitations imposed by the U.S. Constitution (Article I, See.
8) or by the War Powers Act. In France, it turns out that the situation would not be such
a disgrace if the alternate solutions provided by the parliamentary regime-namely, the
political accountability of the Cabinet before the chambers-could be considered as ade-
quate substitutes. Unfortunately, this is not the case because the ultimate responsibility
for defense and foreign policy rests with the President, not the government. Therefore, the
traditional techniques of the parliamentary regime are in this particular case meaningless.
In conclusion, French constitutional practice has reached a point where the distribution
of war powers is seriously unbalanced to the detriment of Parliament. Constitutionally
speaking, the President of the French Republic reigns supreme over peace operations and
Parliament barely has a say in the matter. The situation could even get worse with the
Maastricht Treaty and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that is supposed
to take place as the European Union is taking shape. CFSP provides for possible peace
operations under the name of "joint actions." Under the Treaty, these joint actions can
be undertaken without preliminary authorization by national parliaments. They are not
even subject to preliminary consent by the European Parliament. Last, but not least, the
situation prevailing in France contrasts sharply with the situation in Germany, particularly
since the judgement handed down by the Federal Constitutional Court regarding the partici-
pation of German troops in collective security operations.10 In its judgment of July 12,
1994, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that the German Constitution permits the
deployment of German troops for both collective peacekeeping and collective peace-en-
forcement missions. However the Court held that every deployment of German troops
9 See the commentary made by Dabezies on Article 35 in LA CONSTITTON DE LA RFPUBLIQUE FRANgAISB,
ANALYsEs Er COMMENTAmFS 775-77 (F. Luchaire & G. Conac, eds., 2d ed. 1987).
'o See, G. Nolte, Bundeswehreinsatze in kollektiven Sicherheitssystem, Zum Urteil des Bundesverfassungsger-
ichts vom 12. Juli 1994, 54 ZAORV 652-755 (1994); see also, id. at 684-85 (English summary).
